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The Mutual Obligation Policy in Australia: the
rhetoric and reasoning of recent social security policy
STEPHEN PARKER and RODNEY FOPP
University of South Australia
In 1997 the Federal Liberal–National Coalition Government in Australia embarked
on a radical new eligibility policy for receiving unemployment benefits. Previous
federal governments had increasingly developed more ‘active’ policies to encour-
age people who were unemployed to seek employment and return to the
workforce. But in 1998 the Coalition passed legislation which was substantially
different in its rationale and practice than previous policies. Known as ‘Mutual
Obligation’, this current policy outlines preconditions for receiving unemploy-
ment benefits and the imposition of negative sanctions (breach penalties) should
recipients not comply with them.
Superficially at least, the policy might sound fair, even axiomatic, and has
been met with a degree of popular approval. However, it has aroused criticism
from the key stakeholders, particularly the relevant peak organisations in the
non-government sector. This, in turn has lead to a body of literature which can
be categorised as follows.
The first category includes the examination of the historical development of
current welfare policies in varying detail. Macintyre, for example, identifies the
change in welfare provision as being ‘from entitlement to obligation’, while
Harris also tracks the changing framework of unemployment benefits from the
end of the Second World War to the present.1 Others (most notably Kinnear and
Moss) examine the general ethical and moral basis of Mutual Obligation to
question its appropriateness.2 Secondly, the vast majority of the literature exam-
ines the policy and its the practical implications for people who are unemployed,
illustrates how it exacerbates inequalities, or highlights the tension between the
government rhetoric and the reality for recipients (for example, Eardley et al.,
McInnes, Sanders).3
While such approaches differ from the focus here, the concentration on the
second category of policy analysis is understandable because the urgent political
task has been to highlight the adverse implications of Mutual Obligation for
(largely) unemployed Australians who are disadvantaged by it (or so we would
argue). In other words, priority has been given to analysing how the policy and
its punitive aspects have exacerbated the position of the recipients who are
unemployed. However, in concentrating on policy analysis there is little critical
analysis of the philosophical reasoning on which Mutual Obligation is grounded.
This is the focus of the following article.
In examining the discourse of Mutual Obligation used by the present federal
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258 Stephen Parker and Rodney Fopp
government the following analysis will highlight the language or rhetoric used
by the government to identify (1) the perceived causes of the problem it seeks
to remedy, (2) its attitude to people who are unemployed, and (3) its justification
for the solutions it has prescribed. In so doing, the following will investigate the
discourse of Mutual Obligation in order to determine how the entrenched
philosophical and value basis of Mutual Obligation is articulated or expressed
in and through the policy language and rhetoric. Without such analysis it is
difficult to discern how the policy can be portrayed as a consistent whole, how
such meanings are constructed, and how the language presents as a plausible,
almost axiomatic, policy to many voters. In fact, at least one potential source of
criticism is ignored.
In the existing literature, the main source of policy analysis is the legislative
and regulative framework of the policy. In focusing on the discourse of Mutual
Obligation, the following analysis examines the many statements made about
the policy by the responsible ministers (past and present) in the Australian
federal government. The sources for this analysis are speeches made in public
addresses, departmental information sheets and press releases. How the ‘prob-
lems’ are constructed and defined by the government, their diagnosis and
prescription, and the underlying government values which mould the policy,
can be identified in such documents.
After a brief outline of recent changes to social security policy in Australia
in which Mutual Obligation is embedded, the article seeks to demonstrate that,
as far as the present government is concerned, the sources of the alleged problems
which led to Mutual Obligation are what it labelled ‘official compassion’ which,
in turn, allegedly caused ‘welfare dependence’ at least, and rorting and exploiting
the system at worst. The meaning of ‘mutual’ and ‘obligation’ in Mutual
Obligation are then scrutinised in order to highlight the underlying normative
political philosophy on which the policy is based. The analysis now turns to a
description of the changes in policies for unemployed jobseekers since 1994.
The Federal Labor Government’s approach to labour market assistance
Prior to the introduction of Mutual Obligation in 1998, the former Federal
Labor Government (1983–1996) introduced a number of measures to combat
unemployment. Such changes can be considered as precursors to the policies
introduced under the Liberal Government (1996–present). From 1994, the Labor
Government implemented its Working Nation package of welfare reforms. The
policy sought to reduce the rate of unemployment generally and long-term
unemployment specifically, to 5% by the year 2000.4 Based in part on the
recommendations of Professor Bettina Cass’ 1988 report to the then Department
of Social Security, which emphasised the need for a more active welfare system,
the Labor Government set about promoting a system based on increased training
and work skills for the unemployed.5
Under Working Nation, substantial resources were committed to new pro-
grammes for jobseekers. The main initiatives included: early assessment of
jobseekers who were deemed ‘at risk’ of becoming long-term unemployed;
individually tailored programmes based on a jobseekers’ skills, experience and
degree of ‘job ready’-ness; case workers for those ‘at risk’; and importantly, a
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The Mutual Obligation Policy 259
federally subsidised job placement lasting at least six months for the long-term
unemployed (known as the Job Compact).6
In return for such active support from the then Labor Government, greater
expectations were imposed upon jobseekers, especially the long-term unemployed.
The previous Labor Government stated that there was a:
strong community concern that some unemployed people are making
insufficient effort to find employment, whether through reduced
motivation resulting from long term unemployment, reduced opportun-
ities during the recession, or a perception that they would be better off
on unemployment allowances.7
At the time, the previous Labor Government argued that ‘there is strong
community support for increased penalties for job seekers who refuse to seek
work or who turn down reasonable job offers’.8 Thus penalties were increased
for all jobseekers for breaches of the Activity Test—job search and other activities
required to qualify for income support payment—especially the long-term unem-
ployed. By failing to accept a job offer, among other incidences of non-compliance,
a recipient’s allowance was ceased from between two and six weeks for a first
offence, and for six weeks ‘plus [the] most recent previous penalty’.9
Although these penalties appear harsh, the obligations and sanctions imposed
under Labor were, arguably, more evenly balanced by a commitment to services
for the unemployed, largely because of Labor’s commitment to pro-active
government support for jobseekers in the form of the Commonwealth Employ-
ment Service and other labour market programmes such as the Job Compact. In
this context, the term ‘reciprocal obligation’ was used by Labor to invoke the
balance between the responsibilities of both the state and individual persons.10
The Howard Government’s Policy—1997–present
Although the Coalition Government claimed that it would not alter the basic
eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits, it introduced a range of measures
which emphasised compliance of welfare rules.11 Prior to 1996 jobseekers were
subject to the Activity Test to be eligible for payment. In practice, this meant
that recipients were required to provide evidence of their job search efforts to
Department of Social Security staff (as the relevant Department was then known).
The underlying philosophy was to promote an ‘active’ social security system in
which the recipients’ self-confidence and employment prospects were main-
tained. However, in 1996, the newly elected Howard Government sought to
increase the requirements of the Activity Test and the measures used to adminis-
ter it in order to ‘expose ‘‘dole cheats’’ and those not seriously looking for work’.12
Commentator Dan Finn noted that the incoming government:
proposed that fraud be tackled more rigorously, that recipients would
have to take up work which was offered and that social security officers
would be required to make telephone checks with employers to verify
that unemployed people had approached them for jobs. By tightening
up the system they expected to [quoting the Coalition] ‘produce very
different outcomes’. Indeed, ‘different’ results were vital if the crack
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260 Stephen Parker and Rodney Fopp
down was to generate the projected AU$800m savings from the welfare
bill . . .13
Thus, the new rules regarding the Activity Test provided greater opportunity to
reduce welfare costs.
Before the end of 1997, specific new rules to tighten the Activity Test were
introduced just as it became evident that there would be a substantial reduction
in programmes for the unemployed.14 Under such changes, the old Department
of Social Security was abolished and replaced with Centrelink, a statutory agency
which links several government departments and delivers services to ‘customers’.
The role of Centrelink was to administer income support payment, supervise
compliance measures and refer ‘customers’ to private employment agencies.
Such private sector agencies (collectively known as the Job Network consisting
of approximately 300 private employment agencies nation wide) replaced the
previously publicly run and funded Commonwealth Employment Service (CES)
in May 1998.15 Funding was based on competitive tendering from the private
sector in preference to the federal government’s own Employment National
service which was slowly scaled down and eventually abandoned. Further, the
majority of labour market programmes implemented under Working Nation
(including the Job Compact) were abolished in favour of the principle of self-
help among jobseekers.
Such structural change was paralleled by an effective tightening of eligibility
criteria for payments. In order to receive unemployment benefits (termed News-
tart Allowance), greater details of job search activities of the unemployed were
expected, and the number of employer contacts required each fortnight was
increased and has continued to increase under the Howard Government. These
details were to be recorded on a customer’s Application for Payment form in
order to be eligible for payment in a given fortnight. Similarly, Job Seeker Diaries
were issued to all new applicants requiring, in most cases, at first eight contacts
per fortnight, and subsequently ten. The purpose of these and other required
activities was to provide Centrelink with sufficient evidence to ensure that a
jobseeker was actively looking for full-time employment, so that a customer’s
eligibility for payment could be ascertained.
In addition to these requirements, from 1998, new regulations were put in
place which increased requirements on jobseekers and signalled a change in the
relationship between social security providers and income support recipients.
Initially, this meant that, in addition to job search requirements, Work for the
Dole (WFD) was mandatory for jobseekers 18–24 years of age who had been in
receipt of payments for at least six months.16 Under WFD, jobseekers are required
to participate in community service work for 12–15 hours per week to enhance
individuals’ skills and personal work records.17 However, in July 1998, the
broader concept of Mutual Obligation was applied to jobseekers aged 18–24 and
later to 25–39 year olds (after 12 months on payment).18
In addition to the Activity Test, recipients are required to participate in one
of a prescribed range of activities as part of the Mutual Obligation arrangement.
Fourteen activities are available, including part-time work; voluntary work;
Green Corps; Work for the Dole; literacy and numeracy training; and intensive
job search assistance. For each activity, there is a currently a prescribed number
of hours per fortnight which the recipient must devote to that activity in order
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The Mutual Obligation Policy 261
to fulfil her or his Mutual Activity requirement. In most cases, it is entirely up
to the individual person to choose and find a suitable activity; Centrelink does
not generally provide direct assistance for this.19
Breaching
Failure to satisfy one’s Mutual Obligation requirements or the Activity Test can
result in reduction of payment, or even complete cancellation. An Activity Test
breach can include: failure to attend a job interview, making insufficient employer
contacts in a given fortnight, or not fulfilling one’s Mutual Obligation require-
ments. Penalties range from an 18% reduction for 26 weeks for a first breach up
to a complete suspension of payment for eight weeks for a third breach in a two
year period.20 In monetary terms, penalties range from AU$339 to AU$1304
depending on the type of breach the rate of payment from a base rate of AU$182
per week.21 Importantly, the number of Activity Test breaches has dramatically
increased since 1997. The Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS) found
that there was a 102% increase in the number of breaches applied since 1997,
amounting to over 220,000 breaches and at least AU$170 million in penalties.22
This then is a brief account of the changes to social security introduced by
the previous Labor Government and, in particular, the changes implemented by
the current federal government. The task now is to explore the current govern-
ment’s underlying justification for Mutual Obligation. How did the current
federal government define ‘the problems’ which required remediation? How
were the problems constructed? What was their diagnosis which, in turn, became
their justification for the new policy? What were the underlying values operating
to construct ‘the problem’ in the way they did?
The underlying ‘cause’ of the problem—‘official compassion’
The main ‘problem’ as identified by the federal government’s policy formulators
was the alleged dependency of the unemployed on their income security.
According to its architects and subsequent defenders, the prime cause of the
problem necessitating the development of Mutual Obligation was the previous
social security system. In brief, the ‘problem’ as constructed and addressed was
not decades-old systemic unemployment which ranged between 6 and 11%, but
the welfare state itself.
According to Tony Abbott, the then responsible Federal Minister, ‘[T]he role
of the welfare system in creating and sustaining unemployment has been one of
the great unmentionables of Australian public policy debate’.23 ‘In fact’, argued
Abbott, ‘official compassion arguably has done as much harm as good by trying
to alleviate the results of poverty rather than its causes’.24 According to Mr
Abbott, the downside to the previous federally funded income security system
(including that under the previous Labor Government) was that it attempted to
address the symptoms rather than the causes of long-term unemployment. That
is, it attempted to alleviate poverty rather than address the issue of its causes.
As we shall see, the current Liberal Government believed—and continues to
believe—that the solution to poverty is employment (despite pervasive long-
term unemployment), and it was the income security system that had become a
disincentive to the unemployed seeking work.25
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262 Stephen Parker and Rodney Fopp
The problem—‘welfare dependence’
There are several threads to the construction of the social problem which led to
Mutual Obligation. At least two can be identified in the following statement,
made in 1999, by a former Minister for Family and Community Services, Jocelyn
Newman:
Let me give some feel for the extent of welfare dependency. While we
have record levels of employment, there are now around 2.6 million
people of workforce age on Government income support payments—
around 1 in 5. Ten years ago, the figure was around 1.5 million people,
or around 1 in 7 people.26
According to Newman, the increase in recipients over the decade was indicative
of dependency. In the sense that more Australians are reliant on incomes from
the government the claim seems justified.
However, in addition to the meaning of ‘dependent’ as ‘reliant upon’ or ‘in
receipt of ’, there is another meaning of ‘dependent’ which has different overtones
altogether. This meaning denotes an attitude or practice on the part of the
unemployed which is said to be as a result of them remaining on income
support for extended periods without being obliged to seek work. This type of
dependence is implicitly portrayed as a condition, or an ‘addiction’, which is
said to make unemployed people unable to work. The difference is captured by
noting that dependency can refer to (1) proportionately more Australians being
‘dependent’ on income support (as in ‘reliant’ on the state for their income), or
(2) the view that for a large proportion of the unemployed, so it is alleged,
income support has induced a form of dependency which is not conducive to
seeking employment.
According to the present government, such dependency is a by-product of
the welfare state itself. As the then Minister Newman claimed, this rise in the
numbers receiving income support was the result of ‘more than two-thirds of
these people not [being] required to either look for work or make some other
contribution to community life’.27 Former Minister for Employment and Work-
place Relations in the present federal government, Tony Abbott, explained the
government’s reasoning in the following:
In the absence of rigorous work tests, welfare benefits pitched close to
the level of minimum wages eventually creates a glass floor below
which unemployment cannot fall. Why do some people not work?
Because they do not have to. Why might a generous safety net designed
to help people on the dole, coupled with wage restraint designed to
boost jobs, only make unemployment worse? Because for many people
working has become more trouble than it is worth. Wage restraint might
indeed produce a glut of jobs but not of willing workers to fill them in
the absence of either a strong work ethic or a welfare system geared to
keeping people active.28
The Minister’s comments are revealing in several ways. First, it reinforces the
point made previously that the cause of the ‘problem’ was the previous income
security system. Second, by implication at least, the government’s diagnosis was
aimed at most, if not all, income support recipients and not restricted to
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The Mutual Obligation Policy 263
jobseekers. The assumption is that because recipients of pensions (disability,
aged, for example) and parenting allowances are not required to fulfil work tests,
they are susceptible to the dependency induced by the ‘glass floor’.
Third, Abbott’s comments indicate what the government means by depend-
ency. It is not just that people are reliant but, according to Abbott, that people
do not work ‘because they do not have to’, or because ‘working is more trouble
than it’s worth’. It is more than that. Allegedly, in inducing dependency the
previous policy created a ‘glass floor’, a paucity of willing workers, a weak work
ethic among the unemployed, and a welfare system which fails to keep the
unemployed active.
The alleged ‘harm’ done by ‘official compassion’ is that despite employment
opportunities, many people on welfare do not take up employment because
‘guaranteeing the wherewithal for life can easily remove the motivation for
work’.29 According to this view, income support payments are set, of necessity,
at or near the level of low waged work but do not require the skill or effort
needed for employment. Thus, combined with costs of working (for example,
travelling and paying tax), there is little if any incentive, according to this view,
to take up employment particularly when income from welfare is guaranteed.
Thus the government asserts that for many unemployed people ‘working is
almost more trouble than it’s worth’; the previous system was a disincentive to
work. It removed the motivation to work and increased the attraction of
welfare.30
This lack of motivation has further consequences. According to the govern-
ment, the previous system could lead to an ‘erosion of work skills, lower incomes,
poorer health and risk of isolation from the community’.31 Such recipients are
said to lack work skills, responsibility, social networks, the capacity to participate
in mainstream society, the desire to work and the financial incentives to move
into paid work. Further, dependence is assumed to ‘reduce people’s opportunities
to participate fully in society’ resulting in ‘poor skills and poor chances in the
job market’.32 In other words, the unemployed are said to become dysfunctional
members of society who are not only unwilling but unable to participate in the
work force.
However, the ‘problem’ is not only constructed in terms of the effect of
‘guaranteeing the wherewithal for life’, the lack of motivation, and dysfunc-
tionality. The government’s diagnosis is deeper, further alleging that the system
is open to exploitation; the unemployed exploited the previous social security
system and are still prone to doing so under the current system if recipients are
not kept in check. The assertion made here goes beyond the language about the
negative work ethic which allegedly is the result of the social security system.
According to Newman, ‘our entrenched culture of welfare dependency has
meant that certain members of our community are not only prepared, but feel
entitled to exploit the social safety net’.33 Thus the ‘hammock mentality’ or the
‘entrenched entitlement mentality’ fostered by the previous system encouraged
the unemployed to believe they could expect ‘something for nothing’ because
they are not required to earn the money they received.34
The policy response which counters ‘dependency’—‘mutual obligation’?
If the above is identified by the current national government as the ‘problem’
of long-term unemployment, what solution is prescribed? According to the
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264 Stephen Parker and Rodney Fopp
government, the previous income support structure was deficient because it did
not foster ‘a culture of self reliance’.35 It was, therefore, necessary to change the
system ‘from a largely passive, rigid structure that does not consistently reward
work, to [a system] based on engaging people in active social and economic
participation’, the aim of which is to assist to ‘maximise peoples’ capacity to
improve their lives and to participate more fully in the social and economic life
of their communities’ and foster ‘independence, choice and self-reliance’.36
As outlined above, the policy response was ‘Mutual Obligation’ which is
defined as ‘a broad set of policy initiatives based on the simple yet compelling
premise that responsibility between the community and the individual flows
both ways’.37 This definition implies that what is provided by the state should
be balanced by jobseekers ‘giving something back’ to the community.38 This
allegedly ‘compelling premise’ invokes notions of a ‘social contract’ and a ‘two-
way street’ in which responsibility and obligation supposedly apply to both
parties (the state and the individual). As former Minister Newman stated:
. . . part of the contract the Government has with the Australian people
is the principle of mutual obligation. There are two sides to this. The
Government, on behalf of the community, has an obligation to help
those who cannot provide for themselves. We do this by paying income
support and providing other assistance. This includes employment
services to help people get work.
In return, people who get income support from the Government have
an obligation to tell the truth about their situation and do their very
best to find work. In some cases though, people can get paid if they
make a contribution to the community.39
While the government is ‘to provide adequate income support and other
services’ jobseekers (and other income support recipients) are assumed to be
indebted to society because they receive ‘financial assistance from taxpayers
dollars’.40 Prime Minister John Howard stated that ‘those in receipt of . . .
assistance should give something back in return’.41 Similarly, Newman argued
that those in receipt of income support ‘should be encouraged to give something
back to the community for that financial support’.42 Mutual Obligation allegedly
encompasses the notion of ‘give and take which is part of every dealing worthy
of the term relationship’.43
Put differently, Mutual Obligation is said to be based on the ‘premise that
responsibility between the community and the individual flows both ways’.44
Implicit in this premise is the assumption that the act of receiving income
support generates an obligation.45 That is, if a person invokes his or her right to
welfare, they are therefore obliged to the providers of that support in one or more
ways. When people turn to the state in times of need, especially during periods
of unemployment, they are said to be obliged to ‘give something back’ to the
community which supports them.46 If ‘hard working men and women’ subsidise
unemployment payments, the argument goes, then those who ‘benefit’ from
income support should be compelled to become self-reliant once again and
overcome dependence.47 While on the face of it, this belief seems as compelling
as any home-spun philosophy, critical analysis raises some important questions.
First, what is there about the act of receiving unemployment or other benefits
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The Mutual Obligation Policy 265
which inherently generates a particular obligation? It would seem that any
obligation of this nature is constructed from prior perspectives about the defects
of previous social security arrangements in allegedly undermining values and
behavioural characteristics which the government prizes. The justification for
obligations on recipients can be found in the underlying values of the policy
which stem from both the importance of self-reliance and the government’s
preoccupation with what they regard as the dependency-inducing character of
the previous system.
According to the government, self-reliance is itself perceived to be a virtue,
a desired characteristic, an ‘ought’ which should define a person’s place in
society, and which is set in opposition to ‘dependence’. As Abbott has com-
mented: ‘a dollar earned is different from a dollar received’ even if the monetary
value is the same.48 To not endeavour to become self-reliant is to disadvantage
the rest of society through higher welfare costs and a larger public sector.
According to this view, it is therefore expected that dependent welfare recipients
should become, or be obliged to become, like the ideal citizen: self-reliant, calling
upon one’s own resources in preference to calling upon others.
Further, because welfare dependency is said to remove both the motivation
and ability of recipients to become independent, it therefore becomes legitimate
for the government to impose more stringent requirements—to keep people
active—and penalties for non-compliance. In the words of the government, this
is done by ‘making work pay’ and therefore ‘making non-work not pay’.49 In
this context, it is considered appropriate to increase not only the number but the
force and strength of obligations to achieve self-reliance among recipients.
By defining self-reliance as a preferred characteristic, government policies
which increase the obligation to become independent seem logically justified.
According to the government, strengthened obligations on jobseekers are consid-
ered to correct the balance between the rights and obligations of income support
recipients, a balance which has been distorted by the ‘unconditional welfare’ of
the previous system. Therefore, obligations can be considered fair and reasonable
because they are deemed to achieve an ideal social and economic objective: self-
reliance.
Second, what can be said about the nature and distribution of the obligations
imposed on both individual recipients and the state? On the one hand, people
receiving income support must fulfil the conditions imposed on them in order
to receive payment. They have little choice but to accept the rules and regulations
imposed upon them by the government or face the reduction, suspension or
cancellation of their payment which is, in fact, their main or sole source of
income. On the other hand, the government has the power to define what
obligations must be fulfilled and the penalties applied for breach of those
obligations. Moreover, the government is able to define what its own obligations
are, to establish criteria for the fulfilment of those obligations and to set its own
penalties (or lack thereof ) for non-compliance. In reality, neither the government,
nor Centrelink, nor the private agencies which constitute the Job Network, are
‘obliged’ in the same way as recipients—and certainly they do not face equivalent
penalties for failure to fulfil their obligations which includes loss of livelihood.
Their obligations do not carry the same weight if not fulfilled.
Another question highlights this second point: how are the supposedly
mutual obligations distributed? The answer is that they are distributed unevenly
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266 Stephen Parker and Rodney Fopp
in at least two ways. Despite the fact that in everyday English ‘mutual’ suggests
(at least) a more or less equal exchange, income support recipients neither have
any say in the formulation of the policy nor are they in any real position to
challenge the policies which affect them personally. Put starkly, the issues here
are about livelihood which are only at risk for recipients. The other way in
which obligations are unevenly distributed is that it is only social security
recipients who are selected for this policy while employed Australians in the
housing market, for example, can receive AU$7,000 to buy their first home and
are not expected to ‘give something back’.
Third, if Mutual Obligation is a construction based on the values of good
citizenship as perceived by the government while, simultaneously, enforcing
behavioural compliance as it does to few other groups,50 what is the social
function performed by the language of Mutual Obligation? One answer is that
Mutual Obligation camouflages and mollifies the enormous power which can be
exerted over allegedly non-compliant and inactive income security recipients.
This occurs by the image which is created in the language, and by the language.
To many Australians ‘Mutual Obligation’ sounds eminently fair, perhaps even
axiomatic as a policy premise. While the penalties for breaching are not totally
disguised in the political discourse, the extent of the force of the state is
camouflaged and softened by the seeming self-evident nature of the govern-
ment’s rhetoric of mutuality. That is, by defining the obligations as mutual, their
uneven distribution and considerable power are masked and made to appear fair.
Conclusion
This article has illustrated how Mutual Obligation differs from its predecessors.
It is a policy which is touted as being eminently fair and aimed at increasing
employment among social security income recipients. Nonetheless, the preceding
analysis has shown that the language and rhetoric of the policy is driven by a
set of assumptions, beliefs and values which involve more than the criticism of
the former policy.
The former policy was, arguably, heading in a similar direction. Nonetheless,
in 1998 the new (and still current) Federal Liberal–National Coalition augmented
the increasingly ‘activist’ policies of its predecessor. What transpired was a
policy that increased expectations on the recipients in ways which, if they were
unmet, were regarded as a breach, one negative sanction of which was the
punitive reduction or loss of sole income.
By analysing the rhetoric gleaned from the policy debates, speeches and press
releases, the above analysis has highlighted the underlying premises on which
Mutual Obligation was designed and the diagnosis of the perceived flaws in the
previous policy it was designed to remedy. The cause of the problem was the
‘official compassion’ of the previous social security system, an unusual use of
terms to say the least. As most households with social security as their sole
income are perilously close to an official austere poverty line, compassion would
seem to be rank hyperbole.
According to the current government, the consequence of the previous income
security system was to inculcate a form of dependency, a diagnosis which meant
more than the obvious fact that recipients depend of the government for their
income. Other forces were allegedly at work which supposedly resulted in
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disincentives to work, including the attenuation of the ‘culture of self-reliance’
and the absence of a strong ‘work ethic’. This was extended to the accusation of
recipients exploiting the system. According to the government, it was their
belief that recipients become work shy and exploited the system, it was their
assumption that this was and is rampant, and it was the value of supporting
the individual initiative and independence, which form the basis of the reasoning
and rhetoric of Mutual Obligation.
It may be asked: what is gained by exposing the underlying assumptions,
beliefs and values of Mutual Obligation? There are many possible answers none
of which diminish the importance the other forms of policy analysis mentioned
at the beginning of this article. However, one response is that revealing the
underlying and motivating assumptions, beliefs and values brings to light some
details about the political philosophy on which the policy is based. This, in turn,
highlights a raft of issues including how citizens are defined and how ‘social
problems’ are constructed and explained.
These, in fact, are practical issues because how problems are constructed,
defined and explained has a large bearing in what governments do about them.
In addition, the social construction of social problems includes and excludes
certain issues; the most obvious exclusion in the context of Mutual Obligation is
the fact that there are many, many more people looking for work than there are
jobs—which raises serious questions about the present government’s diagnosis
and prescription, and about the normative and punitive nature of such policies.
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